2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
22 May 2015
English
Original: English and Russian

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

National report submitted by the Russian Federation*

1. The National Report prepared by the Russian Federation for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been shaped in accordance with the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions contained in Part I of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, and includes general categories of issues addressing all the three NPT "pillars" under which the information is reported: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Introduction

2. The Russian Federation remains committed to achieving common goals in the area of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of atomic energy. We consistently advocate the importance of strengthening and universalizing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

3. Acting in full compliance with its NPT obligations, Russia does not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly. Russia does not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

4. The Russian Federation is convinced that strict observance of Article II of the Treaty is one of the major safeguards against the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States.

Section I: Nuclear Disarmament

5. Russia acts responsibly with respect to its international obligations in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. Its strict observance of relevant international treaties and agreements is the core principle of Russian foreign policy reflected in fundamental documents such as the National Security Strategy, the Foreign Policy Concept, and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

* The present document is issued without formal editing.

Please recycle

6. The first step towards true nuclear disarmament was the conclusion of the USSR-US Treaty on The Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty) on December 8, 1987. The Treaty made it possible to eliminate two classes of nuclear missile weapons. Under its provisions, 1,846 intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km) and short-range (500-1,000 km) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and 825 missile launchers were completely destroyed. An aggregate number of more than 3,000 nuclear warheads with a total yield of more than 500,000 metric tons were deactivated. The Treaty is still in force. It remains an important factor of maintaining international security and strategic stability. The Russian Federation remains committed to the Treaty and fully complies with its obligations.

7. The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter referred to as the START I Treaty) which was signed on July 31, 1991, and entered into force on December 5, 1994, marked a new phase of coordinated and verifiable reductions of Russian and US strategic offensive arms.

8. Under the START I Treaty, the Russian Federation was to reduce the number of its strategic weapon delivery vehicles to no more than 1,600, and the number of warheads attributed to these vehicles to no more than 6,000. These obligations were carried out in full and ahead of schedule. As of December 5, 2001, the verification date, the aggregate number of deployed strategic vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) was cut down to 1,136, and the aggregate number of warheads attributed to them was cut down to 5,518.

9. The Moscow Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on Offensive Reductions signed in 2002 was yet another Russian contribution to nuclear disarmament. Under its provisions, by December 31, 2012, Russia and the USA were to reduce the levels of their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,000, i.e. roughly to one third of the limit stipulated by the START I Treaty. These obligations were fulfilled as well.

10. The conclusion of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter referred to as the New START Treaty) on April 8, 2010, in Prague was another milestone in the nuclear disarmament process. The Treaty superseded both the previous START I Treaty that expired on December 4, 2009, and the 2002 Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. In accordance with the provisions of the New START Treaty, each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that, seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed:

- 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers;
- 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers;
- 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

11. As of March 1, 2015, the Russian Party possessed 515 deployed strategic offensive arms vehicles and 1582 warheads attributed to them under the START Treaty. As for deployed and non-deployed launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers, their aggregate number on the date of verification was 890.

12. These figures as compared with data provided in our Report at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concerning the implementation of Article VI, show a considerable and growing contribution of the Russian Federation to the fulfilment of its obligations in the area of nuclear disarmament. In the last five years, the number of deployed delivery vehicles has reduced from 800 to 515, and the number of warheads — from 3900 to 1882 units, i.e. it has been halved.

13. Russian nuclear weapons are under reliable control. The effectiveness of this control is enhanced through both organizational and technical measures. In particular, the total number of nuclear storage sites has been reduced fourfold since 1991. Russia has developed and implemented a set of measures to counter terrorist acts; nuclear and radiation hazardous facilities regularly undergo comprehensive checks for their security and readiness to prevent terrorist acts.

14. Alongside strategic nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation has reduced considerably, by a multiple factor, the quantity of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia's non-strategic nuclear capability today is no more than 25% of the capability the USSR possessed in 1991. Furthermore, all Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons have been transferred to the non-deployed category. Through the above-mentioned steps we have implemented an unprecedented set of measures for the de-alerting of such weapons. These weapons are located exclusively at centralized storage bases within the national territory where a top-level security regime is assured, which rules out any possibility of theft, as well as accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

15. The Russian Federation does not deploy its nuclear weapons beyond its national territory either directly or indirectly; it does not transfer control over its nuclear weapons to other states.

16. Through its nuclear arms reductions the Russian Federation has taken step by step measures to adapt its military doctrine in terms of declining reliance on the nuclear factor. Currently, all standard nuclear weapons are removed from use of Russia's combat army forces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles are on combat duty with zero missions, which means that they are not targeted.

17. The current version of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved by President Vladimir Putin on December 26, 2014, is of clearly defensive nature. According to the Doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons is strictly limited and is solely admitted in two exceptional cases: that of an attack against Russia or its allies involving the use of WMD and that of a threat to the existence of the state itself. Furthermore, the concept of "non-nuclear deterrence" was introduced into the text of the Doctrine which includes a set of military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression against the Russian Federation through the use of non-nuclear means. These alterations were made due to the current military hazards and threats to Russia, since their list was updated taking into account the existing environment.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

18. In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. The Russian Federation, the legal successor of the USSR, didn't carry out any nuclear weapons test explosions since its declaration of independence

in 1991. We intend to pursue this course in the future. We hope that the other nuclear powers will take a similar approach.

19. The Russian Federation ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2000 and is pursuing a consistent policy aimed at ensuring the universalization and early entry into force of this Treaty as the most important international legal mechanism in the area of nuclear arms limitation and nuclear non-proliferation. We are convinced that a comprehensive and no threshold ban on any nuclear explosions is an effective means of restraining the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons.

20. We undertake efforts to support the CTBT in multilateral formats and during bilateral meetings, calling on the States that have not joined the Treaty, first and foremost 8 remaining Annex 2 States, to sign and/or ratify it immediately and without any preconditions. Our country has been a consistent co-sponsor of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in support of the Treaty. We attend the "Friends of the CTBT" meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs that take place biennially and the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty convened by the United Nations Secretary-General. We participate actively in implementing the final declarations of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty, the latest of which was adopted in 2013.

21. Russia fully supports the gradual and balanced creation of the CTBT compliance verification mechanism. We are actively engaged in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO of discussing relevant issues including the on-site inspection regime (OSI). Russian experts took an active part in the OSI integrated field exercise in Jordan in 2014, which was an important milestone towards establishing an inspection mechanism in the framework of the CTBT.

22. The Russian Federation is establishing the second largest segment of the International Monitoring System which includes 31 stations (6 basic and 13 auxiliary seismic stations, 4 infrasound stations, 8 radionuclide stations) and 1 radionuclide laboratory. 26 IMS stations (81 per cent) have been put into operation by now.

23. The Russian Federation is ready to continue down the path of verified and irreversible reduction of nuclear weapons in accordance with the obligations under Article VI of the NPT considering the strategic situation and taking into account the evolution of factors that influence strategic stability.

24. Nuclear disarmament is impossible without taking into account current trends in the sphere of strategic defence weapons. The build-up of anti-missile capacities in Europe and in the world affects strategic stability. The ABM system in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific Region being established by a limited group of States can threaten the effectiveness of strategic deterrence carried out by other countries undermining the global stability. Being fully aware of the danger of such a scenario, the Russian Federation consistently urges for elaboration of guarantees of undirectedness of the European ABM systems against Russian forces of strategic deterrence, which should be legally binding and based on objective criteria.

25. Thoroughly considered collective actions based on the principle of equal and indivisible security for all States without exception are needed to maintain peace and stability. Other approaches can affect the strengthening of both European and global security. Apart from nuclear weapons, in the context of the general strategic situation in the world and general disarmament goals, advanced non-nuclear

weapons systems that are under development, including long-range sea launched cruise missiles and other long-range high-precision systems, become important.

26. Prevention of space weaponization holds a special place in the set of disarmament challenges. The Russian Federation has consistently opposed the deployment of weapon of any type in space, and has undertaken political commitments not to be the first to do it.

27 Deployment of weapons in space would mean not only expansion of military competition, but also its qualitative spurt which can lead to unpredictable consequences for the whole process of arms control, strategic stability and international security in general. It is necessary to prevent the deployment of weapons in space which is one of the important conditions of nuclear disarmament.

28. We should find a solution that would help strengthen international security and stability. The draft Russian-Chinese Treaty on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space is an effective and realistic way to achieve this objective.

29. In general, we think that it is important to focus on reducing the growing conflict potential, addressing urgent problems in strengthening international security and stability, and establishing favourable conditions for further steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes

30. The Russian Federation stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes more than two decades ago. Our country hasn't produced the weapon-grade uranium since 1989. Since 1997, in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation Regarding Plutonium Production Reactors, of September 23, 1997, we have been working on shutting down 13 reactors that had produced weapon-grade uranium. The last of them was closed in 2010. Currently, we are dismantling 9 reactors. The remaining ones are being prepared for dismantlement.

31. In 2013, we finished implementing the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Disposition of Highly-Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement known as the Megatons to Megawatts Program), under which we had converted 500 tons of warhead grade uranium, the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear warheads.

32. In 2014-2015, the Russian Federation actively participated in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts established under the Resolution 67/53 of the UN General Assembly; the report of the Group was circulated for further consideration. We note the substantial contributions made by the Group to substantive analysis of this issue which has never been analysed in such a detailed and comprehensive manner. The Group's work revealed significant differences in approaches to different aspects of a possible treaty. We firmly believe that negotiations on such an agreement should be held exclusively in the framework of the comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the Conference on Disarmaments and on the basis of the "Shannon Mandate", a document CD/1299 of 1995.

Section II: National non-proliferation measures

IAEA safeguards

33. We believe that the main work to strengthen the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is done at the local level in the States Parties themselves. At the same time, we can always achieve better results collectively through the exchange of information and "best practices". The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an extremely important role in this process, facilitating the smooth functioning of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime.

34. The Russian Federation has consistently supported the work of the IAEA and further strengthening of its capacity, including through the provision of adequate resources for its work, in view of the wide range of tasks relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy that it has been charged with.

35. The non-proliferation aspect of the Agency's work is a kind of a key opening the door to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy to the non-nuclear States. Nuclear non-proliferation goes hand in hand with the acquisition of nuclear technologies and is a guarantee that States will be able to advance as far as possible along the path of developing nuclear science and energy production.

36. An important element in ensuring the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the application of IAEA safeguards in accordance with the Article III(1) of the NPT in signatory States, which do not possess nuclear weapons, to assure the implementation of their obligations under the Treaty. The application of these safeguards is an important prerequisite for international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and a tool for confidence-building among States. The Russian Federation continues its active cooperation with IAEA on this issue.

37. In the Russian Federation, more than 30 nuclear facilities are listed as those to which the IAEA safeguards could be applied, in accordance with the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Russian Federation ratified the Additional Protocol to this Agreement in 2007 (Federal Act No. 227-FZ of 2 October 2007).

38. On July 1, 2010, the IAEA chose the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) to start applying its safeguards. The first full format IAEA inspection was conducted on December 13 17, 2010: the IAEA inspectors verified the information presented by the Russian Federation on the design of the facility, checked the actual quantity of nuclear materials in the Center and sealed all containers with guaranteed physical stocks of low-enriched uranium. The latest inspection to check the actual quantity of nuclear materials was conducted by the IAEA on October 8 9, 2014.

39. The Russian Federation has been actively cooperating with the Agency to enhance the safeguards system by providing financial and technical assistance through implementation of a national scientific and technical program to uphold the safeguards. For over 30 years of its existence, significant work has been done to strengthen the technical base of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, and to provide it with new measurement methods, samples of materials and sources, as well as to train staff.

40. In particular, under this program, the Russian Federation provides the IAEA with assistance in analysing in Russian laboratories environmental samples

collected by the Agency during its inspections; new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities are being developed. We place great emphasis on the training of the Agency's inspectors, which goes beyond traditional applications of non-destructive methods of nuclear materials control but also on inspections at isotopic uranium enrichment plants. The Russian specialized institutions continue training of the IAEA Secretariat staff and the personnel from IAEA Member States in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials.

41. Taking into account the prospects of the peaceful nuclear energy development and of various applications with the use of nuclear materials, Russia finds that the work of the IAEA Secretariat to increase technical feasibility and economic efficiency is important. We assume that the IAEA safeguards system should rest on the latest technological innovation, be technically reliable, unbiased, and be realized on the basis of a process transparent to all its member states. In this regard, we believe that first of all it is necessary to implement approaches of so called integrated safeguards for countries that have an effective Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements, and that got the IAEA report on the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

42. Russia is actively participating in deliberations on the safeguards system reform being developed by the IAEA Secretariat. We believe that the Secretariat of the Agency should, under these new approaches, be guided solely by objective and technically sound criteria for the assessment of States, with the list of such criteria to be approved by the Agency's policy-making bodies. We insist that States should be subjected solely to those measures and procedures aimed at verifying nuclear activities that are stipulated by their safeguards agreements. We stress that the IAEA Secretariat, in its conclusions on the application of safeguards, should rely only on that information accuracy of which it is ready to defend in an open debate.

43. With a view to the significance of the Additional Protocol in the context of its guarantee that all nuclear material of a country and its nuclear activities are of a peaceful character, Russia regards its existence as one of compulsory conditions of the transfer of nuclear technology and equipment.

44. Recognizing that signing the Additional Protocol with the Agency is absolutely a free will of a State Party to the NPT, we call on the countries that have not yet done so, sign the Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA and ratify it as soon as possible.

Export control

45. Russia attaches great importance to the implementation of Article III (2) of the NPT. In this regard, we appreciate the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee that have proved in practice that it is possible to establish a coordinated procedure of control over nuclear export on a non-discriminatory basis. Russia builds up its national export control system on the basis of export regulations and control lists and of the listed items, in conformity with the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

46. Russia is an active participant of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We consistently advocate the involvement in the Group's work of States which have significant industrial and export potential and are capable of making a tangible contribution to achieve statutory objectives. We assume that international non-proliferation efforts

should not lead to unreasonable restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies and on civil scientific and technological cooperation.

47. We pursue continuous improvement of all aspects of the NSG's activities. There is an evident interrelationship between non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the modern world. Nuclear energy is actually becoming a resource for ensuring national energy security. At the same time, as the challenge of fully exploiting the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy is faced, the risks associated with the potential proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies are also growing proportionately.

48. Russia has developed and adopted in national legislation strict but objective criteria governing transfers to non-nuclear States of the most sensitive nuclear equipment and technology, such as for uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The most important criterion is that the importing State must be a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With respect to uranium enrichment technology, it is transferred only when appropriate and without revealing basic elements that could be diverted to the production of weapons-grade material. We are working on the universal acceptance of these criteria in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Nuclear security

49. Russia attaches great importance to maintenance of nuclear security at the highest level around the globe. We are guided by the fundamental principle according to which the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear security regime within a State rests entirely on that State.

50. Russia is party to all main international legal instruments in the field of nuclear security, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. We believe that the Amendment's entry into force will promote significant strengthening of the international nuclear security regime. The universalization of these legal instruments is an integral part of the strengthening of nuclear security worldwide. We call upon all States to accede to them.

51. All nuclear materials, their storage sites and corresponding facilities in the territory of Russia, as well as the transportation of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, are provided with the necessary security measures, including physical protection, in compliance with legal and statutory instruments, and with a view to the IAEA recommendations.

52. We believe that the IAEA continues to play a leading role in establishing cooperation between States and sharing experience in nuclear security.

53. It is our view that the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security held in July 2013 provided an opportunity to consider the whole range of issues related to nuclear security, its current state, and ways of its improvement worldwide.

54. We support and take note of the assistance that the Agency provides to its Member States in strengthening their nuclear security systems. In this regard, Russia welcomes in general the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017. Its aim is to strengthen the IAEA's coordinating role in ensuring nuclear security, the wide use of information technologies and modern developments and the delivery of relevant assistance to countries at their request.

55. We support the IAEA efforts aimed at development of guidelines in the field of nuclear security. Russian specialists take an active part in this work. We note the principle of consensus which lies in the basis of the IAEA recommendations in nuclear security.

56. Russia has been making voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2010.

57. Russia provides countries that have embarked on a path towards using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with assistance in improving the level of their nuclear security. Since 1998, we have conducted training for specialists in nuclear security, we continue holding courses and seminars on physical protection at the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Institute of the National Research Nuclear University (MEPhI) in Obninsk and at Tomsk Polytechnic University. More than 500 foreign specialists in physical protection of nuclear materials have already been trained.

58. Russia is constantly working to improve the culture of nuclear security. In 2012, methodological recommendations for organizing and carrying out work pertaining to the nuclear security culture were developed.

59. Seminars on the culture of nuclear security were conducted jointly with the IAEA in Obninsk, in November 2012, December 2013, and December 2014, they were organized primarily for specialists from those counties that are starting using nuclear energy and those that are using, constructing, or planning construction of power reactors developed in Russia.

60. We support the IAEA programme to create and maintain a database on illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. We actively participate in working group meetings aimed at modernization of the database functionality and in exchanging information, and we provide relevant information on a regular basis. A system of criminalistics and other examinations to identify nuclear materials, radioactive substances, and radioactive waste obtained from illicit trafficking is organized in Russia.

61. Aware of the danger that un-controlled radioactive sources can pose, Russia is taking measures to improve systems for their accounting, control and physical protection. Russia adheres strictly to the IAEA's recommendations stated in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and in the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

62. Laws and regulations on accounting for, control and physical protection of radioactive sources and radioactive materials are constantly being improved in the light of both national experience in this area and the experience of foreign states and international organizations, including the IAEA. Thus, in 2012, a new version of the federal standards and rules "The Basic Rules of Accounting for and Control of Radioactive Substances and Radioactive Waste in Organizations" was approved, it establishes requirements for the provision of accounting for and control, with a view to the potential risk categories of radioactive sources; in 2014, a new version of the federal standards and rules "Rules for the Physical Protection of Radioactive Substances, Radiation Sources and Storage Facilities" was approved.

63. The register of radioactive sources is being maintained and improved.

64. In the context of the persistent terrorist threat, we consider it highly important to maintain vigilance and to improve the level of security of information regarding

the system of physical protection of nuclear materials and relevant facilities, as well as to improve the degree of protection of the automated control systems influencing the security at facilities using nuclear power. We are convinced that unnecessary transparency in this sphere can lead to dangerous consequences.

65. Russia supports international efforts aimed at providing protection measures for sensitive information, including cyber-security measures at nuclear facilities. In particular, Russia conducts on annual basis training and methodological seminars on "Information protection issues in automated physical protection systems".

66. Upon the initiative of the Russian Federation, the 18th meeting of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group took place in Saint-Petersburg in 2013 in which leading specialists from laboratories, institutes and national science centres of European, Asian, African and American countries and Australia took part. This event has been the most significant since the foundation of this Group.

67. Simultaneously with monitoring the illicit trafficking of radiological material on the state border, we are creating the image of the system of national illicit trafficking of radiological materials prevention in the territory of the Russian Federation. Its technical implementation is executed in Murmansk, Kaliningrad and Sverdlovsk regions.

68. Alongside with the improvement of nuclear security systems there is a modern national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material created in the Russian Federation. It allows to ensure effective control of the available amount of nuclear material in places where it is stored or used, as well as during the transportation of such material. Our rules governing the national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material are constantly improved.

UN Security Council

69. Russia consistently implements the provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 aimed at countering WMD "black markets" and preventing such weapons and material related to their creation, technologies and delivery means from falling in the hands of non-governmental entities, primarily, terrorist organizations. We actively participate in the work of the UN Security Council Committee created to effectively implement the provisions of the UNSCR 1540.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

70. In 2006, Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which has become today an effective instrument of cooperation and best practices exchange in the field of countering nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security worldwide.

71. The Initiative that currently unites 86 partner nations and four international observers (the IAEA, the UNODC, the EU and the Interpol), made a lodgement as a representative forum of likeminded States which contributes to the building of a common understanding of problems posed by nuclear terrorism threat and searching for optimal ways of their settlement.

72. The GICNT is designed to help develop the international cooperation based on and to give effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, UN Security Council resolution 1540, as well as a number of other

international legal instruments aimed at preventing nuclear material from falling into terrorists' hands. The practical objective of the GICNT is to mobilize as many countries as possible to fulfil the obligations that derive from the abovementioned international legal documents and to ensure international cooperation on this issue.

73. We expect that the activity within the framework of the Global Initiative will increase. It is necessary to concentrate on detailed examination of challenges mentioned in its Fundamental principles. At the same time, we believe that the emphasis should be put on the practical activities — various courses, seminars, staff and field exercises, including joint ones, with the involvement of all the three Working Groups of the Initiative (Response and Mitigation, Nuclear Forensics, Nuclear Detection) whereas the elaboration of the documents should fall by the wayside.

74. Russia, a Co-Chair of the Global Initiative along with the USA since the moment it was launched, organized a number of GICNT events among which the international demonstration exercise "Strazh-2012" conducted in September 2012 in the city of Moscow and the town of Dmitrov in Moscow Region stands out particularly. The aim of the exercise was to exchange best practices on suppression of the illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radioactive sources. The delegations of 48 States, observers from the European Commission, the IAEA, the Interpol, the UNODC, as well as 198 Russian specialists participated in the event. The latest technological developments of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the State Corporation "Rosatom" in the field of detection of nuclear and radioactive substances in the traffic flows, corresponding technologies and equipment along with the work of special detachments of the Federal Security Service of Russia and emergency technical groups of the State Corporation "Rosatom" on countering the threats of nuclear terrorism and rectifications of their consequences were demonstrated in the course of the exercise.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

75. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is one of the important instruments for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole and the NPT regime in particular. By creating NFWZ and thus implementing the Article VII of the NPT, the States actually contribute to enhanced regional and international stability and security and increased mutual confidence. Russia consistently supports this process and cooperates with States in their efforts to create such nuclear-weapon-free-zones and formalize their status.

76. We welcome the efforts of the Central Asian countries and P5 that opened the way to the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. That became a real practical contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

77. In April 2015, the law on the abovementioned Protocol was adopted by both houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

78. We are satisfied that regarding formalization of the status of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in South-East Asia, we have successfully embarked on the final stage of the work. The P5 has played its part and done its utmost to ensure early signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in South-East Asia. We expect ASEAN countries to take a position on reservations and statements

of the P5 countries to the Protocol in a short time and we will be able to complete the signing procedure.

79. In accordance with the 2010 Action Plan, one of the key issues of the current review cycle is to commence the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery.

80. We take with all seriousness the instruction by the Parties to the NPT to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We intent to make further vigorous efforts to held this event at the earliest possible moment. We believe that it is important to continue the dialogue with the involvement of the countries of the region for early convening of the Conference. However, it must be noted that in the last five years an unprecedented process was launched in this field, in the course of which all the involved parties, including Arabs and Israeli sat at the same negotiating table.

Solution to regional challenges to the non-proliferation regime

81. Russia takes an active part in the international efforts to find solutions to regional challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, notably the framework of the negotiations of the P5+1 (Russia, China, USA, Great Britain, France, and Germany through the intermediary of the EU) and Iran on the settlement of the situation concerning Iran's nuclear programme and also in the Six-Party Talks on the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula.

82. We consistently advocate the idea that regional challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation can and must be addressed solely via political and diplomatic means on the basis of the NPT and the inviolability of its provisions, in strict compliance with the rules of the international law and in line with the legitimate security and development concerns of all States.

83. The impressive progress in negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme which is achieved to date, confirms the validity of this approach. In fact, the concept solutions proposed by Russia were implemented, such as principles of a step-by-step approach and reciprocity, the recognition of Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment under strict and effective international control. Russia will continue to make all necessary efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear programme by June 30. We believe that a future agreement should be based on the generally recognized rules of international law and also the instruments the IAEA safeguards, without setting any harmful precedents.

84. We expect that a similar approach will prevail in regard to the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula which also requires an early resolution in the interests of regional and international peace and security.

Section III: National Measures Relating to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

85. Russia consistently advocates broader access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for the States Parties to the NPT, development of international cooperation in this field, as well as a necessary balance between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general and the IAEA safeguards system in particular. Russia, according to Action 47 of the 2010 Action Plan, "respects each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

Development of civilian nuclear energy around the world

86. Recent IAEA projections show a constant increase in the use of nuclear energy around the world. It means that the world community is overcoming the psychological shock caused by the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. In the wake of it, relevant lessons were learnt and conclusions drawn, additional security measures were undertaken, to make nuclear energy a reliable and eco-friendly source of energy.

87. The IAEA International Ministerial Conference "Nuclear Power in the 21st Century", held in Saint-Petersburg in June 2013, under the auspices of the IAEA and in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), became a representative forum and covered a full range of issues including energy resources and environment, contribution to the sustainable development, efforts to improve nuclear safety, development of infrastructure, and promotion of innovations in nuclear energy.

88. By December 31, 2014, there were 438 nuclear power units in operation worldwide, with a total capacity of 375.9 GW. 70 more units are under construction.

Russia's strategy

89. In 2014, Russia celebrated the 60th anniversary since the launch of the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk. This launch ushered in an era of peaceful use of nuclear energy as a new source of meeting the energy demands. Today, Russia's nuclear "fleet" consists of 33 nuclear power units, with a total capacity of 25.2 GW. Nine power units of 10 GW capacity and one floating nuclear thermal power plant "Akademik Lomonosov" with capacity of 80 MW, are under construction. There are operating plants that provide with nuclear fuel not only Russian NPPs, but nuclear plants in many countries of the world as well.

90. Alongside with large-scale construction of nuclear power plants with thermal reactors, Russia is working on creating a new generation of closed nuclear fuel cycle technologies and fourth-generation fast-neutron reactors.

91. Russia is the only country in the world where a 600 MW fast-neutron reactor has been operating successfully for many years; the construction of a prototype of an 800 MW (BN-800) reactor has been completed. Physical launch of the reactor is now underway. An experimental fast-neutron reactor based on Russian technology is operating in China. In the long term, Russia associates nuclear power development with this type of reactors and with a closed nuclear fuel cycle.

92. At the Research institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad, a project is being implemented to construct a new multipurpose fast research reactor intended to replace the only BOR-60 sodium-cooled fast-neuron research reactor in operation there. We are planning to create an international research centre at the site of the multipurpose fast research reactor.

Bilateral cooperation and projects

93. At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on 23 May, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that: "We do not only deliver and trade nuclear energy equipment but also create a separate industry, it is both science and training of personnel. In this regard, we are planning to further develop nuclear energy as a

science. We participate in international projects. We intend to build the most up-to-date nuclear power plants and most protected in terms of security."

94. Today, the first unit of the Belarusian NPP and the third unit of the Tianwan NPP in China are under construction, the construction contract for Hanhikivi-1 NPP has been signed. Technical documents, in accordance with the procedures for the acquisition of licenses and authorizations for constructing the Akkuyu NPP, have been worked out and submitted to the Turkish supervision and state bodies.

95. In March 2014, Russia and Hungary signed intergovernmental agreements on cooperation on the project to expand and upgrade of the Paks NPP as well as on the project budgeting. Russian technology won the tender for the construction of the first NPP in Jordan.

96. Russia attaches great importance to the development of cooperation with countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy, notably with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. It creates the necessary base for the implementation of specific bilateral projects.

97. Russia provides newcoming countries with assistance in establishing all necessary infrastructure for successful and safe implementation of their national nuclear energy programmes — regulatory framework, spent nuclear fuel (SF) and radioactive waste (RW) management systems, training of skilled personnel, especially in those countries, where the construction of NPPs is based on Russian technology.

98. The issues of spent fuel and radioactive material management are known obstacles to countries' large-scale use of nuclear energy. This is not only a complex technological issue, but also a key aspect in the context of population's attitude to a nuclear energy programme.

99. Russia attaches special importance to the solution of spent fuel and radioactive waste management issues. Russia has ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. In July 2011, the Federal Law No.190-FZ On Management of Radioactive Waste and Amendment to Some Acts of Law of the Russian Federation was adopted. Since 2007 Russia has been carrying out the Federal target programme Nuclear and Radiation Safety in 2008 and for the Period up to 2015.

100. For many years, leading experts including the IAEA have noted that this problem can only be solved by inter-state, regional and global cooperation in the area of the back-end of the NFC. In particular, a possible solution would require a NPP supplier country to provide a comprehensive service package. Essentially it means that the country does not only supply nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel for them but also removes spent nuclear fuel for its further handling. Russia uses this approach in cooperation with some countries.

101. Our country continues to use the practice of returning spent fuel from research reactors of Russian design. The return of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from research reactors in third countries is conducted through cooperation with the US and with the participation of the IAEA.

102. In total, since the launch of the program, 800 kg of fresh fuel and 1,346 kg (hereinafter, the data refers to uranium) of irradiated HEU fuel (that is to say, 2,146 kg of nuclear fuel that would be enough to produce about 85 nuclear weapons) have been removed from 14 countries.

103. To date, Russia has completely removed HEU fuel from 4 countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya and Romania. Fresh HEU fuel has been removed from Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania; spent HEU fuel — from Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya and Romania. HEU fuel has been partially removed from 9 countries. Fresh HEU fuel has been partially removed from Vietnam, Germany, Libya, Poland, Serbia, Uzbekistan, the Czech Republic, Hungary. Spent HEU fuel has been partially removed from the Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland.

104. Russia also participates in international efforts aimed at minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium in nuclear fuel for research reactors where it is technically feasible and economically justified.

105. Russia has evaluated and confirmed the technical and economic possibility to convert six research nuclear reactors in the National Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute", the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors and the Tomsk Polytechnic University from HEU to LEU. Currently, the efforts are focused on developing and certifying new high-density LEU fuel necessary to convert reactors IRT MEPhI, IRT in Tomsk and IR 8 in the National Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute". The decision on the actual conversion will be taken after an additional evaluation of its economic consequences. Activities on converting the ARGUS reactor in the National Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute" are planned for 2015.

106. Further development of nuclear energy, its large-scale use for the purposes of economic development require joint efforts by the countries concerned to implement a systemic approach to tackling complex tasks connected to such development. Apart from being its initiator, Russia remains a leading sponsor of the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles INPRO.

107. INPRO has become a fully-fledged mechanism and advanced centre for the comprehensive analysis of proposed and planned nuclear power systems which examines a set of factors including, inter alia, infrastructure, security, minimization of radioactive waste and protection of the environment. Thanks to this intellectual platform, the understanding of technological innovations and institutional features that facilitate the transition to sustainable nuclear power systems is improving among member States. The number of countries participating in INPRO has reached 40. In January 2014, the INPRO project was converted into a fully-fledged section within the Department of Nuclear Energy of the IAEA Secretariat.

108. We wholly support the need to conduct within the INPRO framework a study on "Cooperative Approaches to the Back End of Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Drivers and Legal, Institutional and Financial Impediments" as provided for in the resolution of the 58th session of the IAEA General Conference. We are certain that it will be called upon by a wide scope of member States and will attract leading experts from States that supply and use nuclear power technologies to participate in it. Russia for its part is ready to support such an initiative by the Agency and participate actively in its implementation.

109. Russia remains among the leaders in working together with the IAEA to develop the concept of fuel assurance and multilateral approaches to NFC services.

110. Under the Initiative by the President of the Russian Federation as of 2006, all the elements stipulated in the agreement on establishing the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) jointly with the Republic of Kazakhstan have been implemented. In addition to the IUEC, a LEU reserve was established on Russia's

initiative and under the auspices of the IAEA. Its volume is 120 tons of low-enriched uranium enriched up to 5 per cent to ensure its guaranteed supplies to the Agency's Member States that face a non-commercial disruption of LEU supply. The reserve is constantly on standby. Russia is bearing all the expenses associated with storage, maintenance of the material, ensuring its nuclear safety and security and the application of safeguards.

111. Russia supports the IAEA project to establish a LEU Bank in Kazakhstan and participates in the project ensuring guaranteed transit of uranium both to and from the Bank across its territory, it has also expressed its readiness to provide the IUEC services to stock the LEU Bank.

112. This project helps achieve the goals of developing and expanding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while simultaneously strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in which the NPT is a key element and a guarantor.

Cooperation with the IAEA and Technical Cooperation through the IAEA

113. We highly appreciate the work of the IAEA Secretariat to stimulate cooperation between States in the Department of Technical Cooperation and the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications. Russia is a donor of the Technical Cooperation Fund and it abstains from using the resources of the Fund for national projects for the benefit of other European countries. In addition to this, together with the IAEA we implement regional projects to enhance the skills of medical physicists in the field of radiation oncology and to train specialists in the recultivation of uranium waste storages.

114. We believe that the most important priorities for us are scientific research and development of radiation technologies; the use of "peaceful atom" in medicine, space, agriculture, industry, and in other key branches of the national economy, in security screening equipment. We are pleased that the Agency pays growing attention to these directions as well.

115. In confirmation of these words, in 2014 Russia allocated 5 million rubles for the IAEA ReNuAL project aimed at modernization of the Agency's research laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria.

Nuclear Security and Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage

116. Russia consistently continues to strengthen the national potential for ensuring secure use of nuclear energy and along with it has been intensifying its interaction with the IAEA in this sphere. Russia is Party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Since 2005, Russia has been a party to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.

117. Russian specialists are actively and comprehensively participating in the implementation of the Agency's Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. A series of additional Russia — IAEA projects supporting the implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety are realized as well as a series of other international initiatives that are voluntary on our part and aim at checking and ultimately confirming the safe status of Russian nuclear technology.

118. In 2014, Russia participated in a series of meetings of the Contracting Parties to international legal instruments that regulate the way nuclear safety of various types of nuclear facilities and activities is ensured. We especially note the Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, where, taking into account the years-long practice of reviewing the Convention and especially the last three years, reasonable and important updates of the mechanisms of the implementation of the Convention were introduced. We are also satisfied with the system of periodic reporting that entered the practice of meetings under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident two years ago with our participation and that immediately let us understand not only the level of the others' awareness of the state of affairs in emergency response in the reporting party, but also ensure that the reporters themselves understand what has been done and what is still to be done.

119. We note with satisfaction IAEA's practice of organizing safety missions as an additional and effective mechanism to improve nuclear safety all over the world and in each individual country. At the end of 2013, the Russian regulator Rostechnadzor hosted the Agency's follow-up mission to analyse how the recommendations given by the 2009 mission to review the effectiveness of the regulator's activities were carried out. The medium-term schedule for hosting the Agency's missions on safety of operating Russian nuclear power plants has been coordinated with the IAEA Secretariat and is being successfully implemented.

Other Actions Taken in Order to Implement and/or Strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

120. In 2010–2014, Russia, thanks to the activities of its academic and non-governmental organizations, fully complied with its obligations under paragraph 22 of the Action Plan adopted on the basis of the findings of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

121. In May 2010, Russia — alone among the nuclear-weapon States — signed the Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. This event reflects the success achieved by organizations from Russia in the development of education regarding non-proliferation, as well as new plans to support training initiatives regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, programmes for in-depth study of these issues, and information and education-based promotion of these issues among the general public.

122. Recognizing the great responsibility with which our country has been entrusted as depositary of the Treaty, we consider the issue of withdrawal from the NPT to be an important one. We believe that any decisions in this respect should not lead to a revision of Article X, reopening of the text of the Treaty or undermining of one of the fundamental principles of a State's sovereign right to withdraw from an international agreement. However, we support the need for a constructive exchange of views on the defining of agreed recommendations regarding the procedures for and consequences of a possible withdrawal from the Treaty. We believe that making States more accountable for a decision to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with Article X thereof could be one of the ways to strengthen the NPT.

123. Strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation. We intend to do our utmost to make the current NPT review process as effective as possible. Our overriding priority is to ensure proper functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, so that we can progress towards our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
22 May 2015

Original: English

New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

Report submitted by the Republic of Korea

1. In accordance with the requirement stated in Action 20 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Republic of Korea hereby submits a report, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, on the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 NPT RevCon, article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament," and 13 practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Review of the Treaty

2. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It is our conviction that maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty is vital for its integrity and viability. To this end, it should be noted that nuclear disarmament is an indispensable part of the core bargain of the NPT, and thus disarmament is obligatory for the nuclear weapon states, as laid out in Article VI of the Treaty, and is fundamental to the full implementation of the Treaty.

3. As a non-nuclear weapon state, the Republic of Korea continues to abide by its commitments pursuant to the Treaty not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The Republic of Korea has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to respect all international agreements on non-proliferation and pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, enhancing international confidence.

4. The Republic of Korea recognizes the efforts made thus far by the nuclear weapon states for the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. Yet it seems that there still

* The present document is issued without formal editing.

Please recycle

remain gaps between the achievements of the nuclear weapon states and the level of expectations on the part of non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, it is imperative to pursue efforts to close this perception gap and restore trust between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Mindful of the grand bargain that the NPT stands on, as indicated above, non-nuclear weapon states should strengthen their commitment to non-proliferation, while the nuclear weapon states should do their part in making real progress on nuclear disarmament. By doing so, the nuclear weapon states can enjoy moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms. The Republic of Korea therefore urges all nuclear weapon states to implement their obligations under Article VI in good faith.

5. There is an urgent need for the international community to bolster the NPT-based international non-proliferation regimes as the NPT faces unprecedented challenges, such as cases of non-compliance, the heightened threat of nuclear proliferation, and the potential nexus between terrorists and WMD. The Republic of Korea fully supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1887, a landmark document which clearly sets the overarching tasks ahead of us in the coming years and fully endorses the goals stated therein. The Republic of Korea continues to work closely with States Parties to the Treaty to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

6. As there is an emerging threat of non-state actors, including terrorist groups, gaining access to nuclear and radiological materials, nuclear security has now become an integral part of achieving nuclear non-proliferation. During this review cycle, much progress has been made in international efforts to enhance nuclear security, most notably with the three Nuclear Security Summits. As the chair and host of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the Republic of Korea has played an active role in intensifying international efforts to combat nuclear and radiological terrorism as well as securing and minimizing nuclear materials. The Republic of Korea will continue to play a constructive role to enhance nuclear security through active participation in the work of the relevant international organizations and initiatives, including the UN, the IAEA, INTERPOL, the Global Partnership (GP) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

Implementation of Action Plans

Pillar 1: Nuclear Disarmament (Actions 1-22)

7. The Republic of Korea is firmly committed to the objectives of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is an obligation for all NPT parties, including the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). The Republic of Korea calls upon the Nuclear Weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, including the steps specified in Action 5 in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT RevCon and to agree on a standard reporting form on disarmament measures as called for in Action 21. In this regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes relevant efforts by the five Nuclear Weapon States, in particular the regular Conferences held among them during this review cycle. The Republic of Korea encourages the Nuclear Weapon States to produce more tangible results through this process, especially in the area of nuclear disarmament.

8. The members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) need to break the two decades of stalemate by adopting a programme of work and embarking on a substantive discussion on the core issues of nuclear disarmament. With respect to security assurances, the Republic of Korea believes that credible and reliable

negative security assurances (NSAs) should be accorded to the Non-nuclear Weapon States that are parties to the NPT and in full compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

9. The Republic of Korea continues to support an early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, referred to as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It should also be emphasised that pending the conclusion of an FMCT, all states should declare or observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In this regard, the ROK welcomes the report and the recommendations on the FMCT adopted by the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in April 2015.

10. The Republic of Korea underscores the necessity of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Republic of Korea signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 and ratified the Treaty on 24 September 1999. The Republic of Korea calls for the early signing and ratification of the Treaty by those states that have not yet done so, especially those states listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is required for its entry into force. In this respect, the Republic of Korea welcomes the ratification of the Treaty by the Government of Indonesia in February 2012.

11. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, all States should refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosive explosions, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions should be maintained. In this respect, it is extremely deplorable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009 and February 2013, which directly violate the object and purpose of the Treaty. The DPRK should join the CTBT at the earliest date and abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094.

12. The Republic of Korea supports and contributes to the development of a verification regime for the Treaty, especially by participating in the international monitoring system through its Korean Seismic Research Station (KSRS) in Wonju, located in the northeastern part of its territory. The Republic of Korea hosted CTBT-related trainings and technical workshops on regional cooperation and verification in 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013. The Republic of Korea will also host the CTBT Group of Eminent Persons Meeting(GEM) in June 2015.

13. It is the view of the Republic of Korea that irreversibility is one of the fundamental principles in nuclear disarmament measures. Only the irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons can ensure that re-deployment will not be possible. The Republic of Korea shares the view that the principle of irreversibility should be applied in all disarmament and arms control measures.

14. The Nuclear Weapon States are required to put their unequivocal commitment to disarmament into action by making systematic efforts. As a matter of principle, transparency should be applied to all the process of disarmament and arms control efforts.

15. The Republic of Korea is actively participating in international efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. The Republic of Korea, as a state party to all major disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and all

export control regimes, believes that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Pillar 2: Nuclear Non-proliferation (Actions 23-46)

16. Universal adherence is essential for the viability of the NPT. The Republic of Korea urges the countries which remain outside the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states without further delay.

17. The Republic of Korea concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with the IAEA in October 1975 and ratified the Additional Protocol (AP) in February 2004. The Republic of Korea is of the view that the additional protocol (AP) together with comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) represents a new verification standard and the universal adherence to them is essential in ensuring confidence in the compliance of State Parties with Treaty obligations. The Republic of Korea urges those States Parties that have yet to bring into force CSAs to do so as soon as possible and without further delay. The Republic of Korea calls upon all States Parties which have yet to bring into force APs to do so as soon as possible.

18. The Republic of Korea continues to support efforts of the IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system. The Republic of Korea has been a strong contributor to the Agency's Member State Support Programme (MSSP). It pledged 2 million US dollars in cash and in kind to the MSSP. The Republic of Korea hosted the 2nd Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) in July 2011 which aimed to improve the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation in the region. On its part, the Republic of Korea is making continual efforts to strengthen the legal and institutional framework for a comprehensive national nuclear control system. Integrated safeguards are being implemented in the Republic of Korea since July 2008 after a broader conclusion was drawn for the country at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in June 2008.

19. The Republic of Korea authorizes nuclear related exports only when it is satisfied that the exports would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or be diverted for acts of nuclear terrorism. The Republic of Korea maintains effective and robust nuclear export controls based on the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

20. The Republic of Korea, when making nuclear export decisions, duly takes into account whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in accordance with its relevant rules and regulations.

21. The Republic of Korea attaches importance to preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and enhancing relevant international cooperation among States parties, in clear recognition of the ever-increasing threat that nuclear and other radioactive materials may fall into the hands of terrorists, criminals and other irresponsible actors. In this regard, the Republic of Korea fully endorses relevant action measures contained in the 2010 Washington Communiqué and its Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Communiqué and the 2014 Hague Communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit. The Republic of Korea shares information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials by participating in the IAEA illicit trafficking database (ITDB) and Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC). It operates a

Megaport initiative in the port of Busan. It hosted a regional exercise on nuclear forensics jointly with the IAEA in August 2011 and an international workshop on nuclear material tracking and detection systems in November 2011.

22. The Republic of Korea fully endorses and supports the goals and objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that aims to combat shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. The Republic of Korea hosted a regional workshop, a maritime interdiction exercise of the PSI in October 2010 in Busan and an Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in September 2012. Moreover, the Republic of Korea is scheduled to host the Asia-Pacific Outreach Workshop in July 2015.

23. Since 2004 the Republic of Korea has been contributing to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and welcomed its extension beyond 2012. The Republic of Korea hosted a plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in Daejeon in June 2011 as well as a meeting of the GICNT Implementation Assessment Group (IAG) in Seoul in July 2014. The Republic of Korea together with Australia has been co-sponsoring the resolution on "Preventing and Combating Illicit Brokering Activities" at the UN General Assembly biennially since 2008.

24. The Republic of Korea strongly supports global efforts to strengthen nuclear security worldwide with the conviction that nuclear security, together with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, will serve as an important factor in advancing a world without nuclear weapons. The Republic of Korea has actively participated in the three Nuclear Security Summits, including the 2012 Seoul Summit. Since the last Summit in Hague, the Republic of Korea has successfully implemented its commitments to carry on with the multilateral project on high-density low-enriched uranium fuel (U-Mo), establish the Nuclear Centre of Excellence and execute the Radiation Source Location Tracking system (RADLOT) in Vietnam, among others.

25. At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, President Park Geun-hye put forth a four-point proposal for advancing the global nuclear security architecture. The four points include a holistic approach to promote synergy among nuclear security, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; regional dialogue mechanisms in the area of nuclear security; overcoming the capacity gap among States in implementing nuclear security; and tackling the new threat of cyber terrorism against nuclear facilities. The Republic of Korea will continue its efforts in the area of nuclear security to push ahead with these proposals and to enhance cooperation between countries within the relevant international architecture.

26. The Republic of Korea supports the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, in particular the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), as essential building block of the global nuclear security architecture. Following the revision of relevant national laws, the Amended CPPNM and the ICSANT were ratified and came into force in May 2014.

27. The Republic of Korea has abided by the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, in addition to the

Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.

28. A two-week International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission was conducted in February 2014 by the IAEA to review the nation's nuclear security-related legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities as well as security arrangements. The Republic of Korea is carrying out the recommendations and suggestions by the IPPAS with a view to further strengthening the ROK's nuclear security regime.

29. An early resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue is vital to ensuring the integrity of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as to securing peace on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Strenuous efforts have been made to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the DPRK through dialogue, including the Six-Party Talks. However, it is extremely regrettable that despite these efforts the DPRK carried out another nuclear test in February 2013 and multiple missile launches in April and December 2012 in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).

30. In its Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2012/13) and resolutions 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), the Security Council strongly condemned the third nuclear test and the launches by the DPRK and demanded that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, including that it abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any further provocation.

31. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors to access weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. The resolution plays a crucial role in filling the loophole of the current non-proliferation regime by laying out such effective measures as implementation reporting, country visits, assistance and capacity-building measures. As the chair of the 1540 Committee in 2013 and 2014, the Republic of Korea supports universalizing the implementation of the resolution and is willing to continue its efforts for achieving that goal. It convened the High-Level Security Council Open Debate to commemorate the 10th anniversary of Resolution 1540 on 7 May 2014 to gather the political will of the member states and adopted a presidential statement (document S/PRST/2014/7), and hosted a regional workshop for promoting implementation of resolution 1540 in the Asian region in October 2014.

Pillar 3: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Actions 47-64)

32. The Republic of Korea fully recognizes the right of States Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and is committed to facilitate nuclear cooperation among States Parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty. The Republic of Korea places a higher priority on the fullest possible utilization of nuclear energy as it can contribute not only to the energy security of States but also to human health, food security, water resource management, and so forth.

33. The Republic of Korea continues to expand bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. The Republic of Korea has currently concluded nuclear cooperation

agreements with twenty-nine countries and there are several either in the pipeline or under negotiation.

34. The Republic of Korea fully supports the IAEA technical cooperation programme as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries in need. The Republic of Korea has been cooperating with the Agency in advancing various technical cooperation projects including the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). The Republic of Korea supports the capacity building of radiation medicine in PACT Model Demonstration Sites countries such as Vietnam, Mongolia, Sri Lanka and Yemen. Specifically, the Republic of Korea has provided fellowship training in the fields of radiotherapy and cancer diagnosis, and also dispatched experts to the sites upon the installation of new radiation equipment or the application of new treatment technology.

35. The Republic of Korea provided a financial contribution to the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) Program of the IAEA with the conviction that the PUI will serve as a real asset in facilitating cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the PUI will significantly enhance the Agency's ability to provide developing countries with wider access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Republic of Korea has provided a total of about 4,300,000 US dollars to the PUI including a project to develop an e-learning module on nuclear power plant infrastructure in collaboration with the IAEA. The Republic of Korea also supports various Regional Cooperative Agreement (RCA) projects in the fields of cancer treatment, marine environment and the management of RCA activities and the IAEA's activities like Coordinate Research Programme (CRP) and renewal of IAEA's laboratory in Seibersdorf. Moreover, it has constantly made in-kind contributions to the IAEA's activities by sending experts to RCA projects as lecturers and hosting meetings and training courses.

36. The Republic of Korea carries out all nuclear activities in a manner that ensures the highest standards of nuclear safety and security. After the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, the Republic of Korea conducted stress tests on all twenty-one nuclear power plants in operation, which found that all plants are operating in compliance with rigorous safety standards and are able to withstand natural disasters. The Republic of Korea set up the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) in October 2011 as an independent agency responsible for issues related to nuclear security, safety, and safeguards, which will serve to reinforce Korea's regulatory capacity in nuclear security.

37. The Republic of Korea hosted an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in July 2011 and actively follows up on the identified recommendations and suggestions.

38. The Republic of Korea hosted the IAEA INPRO Dialogue Forum in 2012 titled "the Long-term Prospects for Nuclear Energy in the Post-Fukushima Era". An active engagement through the collaboration of the IAEA member states and the participants was made.

39. The Republic of Korea is of view that the production and stable supply of radioactive isotopes for medical uses can improve quality of human life. To this end, the Republic of Korea plans to build a new research reactor equipped with an

isotope production facility by 2018. In addition, the construction of the Radiation Mutation Breeding Center equipped with state-of-the-art radiation fusion research experimental facilities was completed in 2013. The Republic of Korea is committed to contributing to the global community by conducting radiation research activities and providing education and training programs.

40. Despite the significant advancements in nuclear technology, developing countries have yet to fully benefit from nuclear energy. In fact, we are witnessing an ever-widening technological gap between the developed and developing countries. As a measure to reduce this gap, the Republic of Korea has developed the Integrated Regulatory Infrastructure Support System (IRISS) program, which has been designed in compliance with the IAEA Safety Fundamentals requirements and guides to provide guidance and consultation to nuclear newcomers with regard to establishing a regulatory infrastructure and strengthening competency of regulatory bodies. The Republic of Korea also founded the International Non-proliferation and Security Academy in February 2014 with the objective of educating and training experts and government officials of countries embarking on nuclear power programs, and hosted a mentoring workshop in November 2014 with the IAEA.